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THE TOWER OF ZAHN STANDS IN LOOSE SAND:
ZAHN v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.1
Class action suits2 were created for a twofold purpose:
(1) [T]o reduce units of litigation by bringing under one umbrella what
might otherwise be many separate but duplicating actions; (2) even at
the expense of increasing litigation, to provide means of vindicating the
1. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
2. The class action device was initiated in the federal system by the passage of rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The original rule 23, enacted in 1938,
read in part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more,
as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue
or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
The causes of action included in this rule were classified into three categories, com-
monly labeled "true," "hybrid," and "spurious," depending on the nature of the right
asserted. Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
98 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee's Note]. Professor Moore, who
is credited with devising these categories, explains them as follows:
The true class suit involved principles of compulsory joinder and rights of a joint
* . character; and a judgment, whether favorable or unfavorable, was res judicata
as to the class. The hybrid class suit involved rights of a several character, where
the object of the action was the adjudication of claims which do or may affect
specific property involved in the action; and the judgment was conclusive as to
those rights insofar as they affected the property. The spurious class suit dealt
with rights of a several character where there was a common question of law or
fact; and the judgment was binding only upon the original parties (and their priv-
ies) and those who intervened and became parties.
3B J. MooRE, FDERAL PRAcIrlcE § 23.02-1, at 23-121 to 23-122 (2d ed. 1948)
[hereinafter cited as Moon,.] See also C. WIGHT, FEDmR.L Cotmrs 310-11 (2d ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. The apparent simplicity of these labels is deceptive.
Courts called upon to apply them exhibited considerable confusion. Z. CHMFER, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQurrY 257 (1950).
The 1966 amendment to the rules substantially re-wrote the rule 23 class action. It
provides in part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class ac-
tion if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
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rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.3
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gen-
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigations con-
cerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the man-
agement of a class action.
The primary reason for the re-drafting was to substitute a functional approach in place
of the artificial categories, with the new rule defining the criteria for various class ac-
tions. Advisory Committee's Note, supra at 98-99. Professor Moore capsulized the
new rule's categories as follows:
Revised subdivision (b) provides for three types of class actions: (1) where sepa-
rate actions would create a risk of varying adjudications (A) to the party opposing
the class, or (B) to the members of the class; (2) where injunctive or declaratory
relief on behalf of the class is appropriate; and (3) where common questions of
law or fact warrant class action. These three categories are not necessarily mu-
tually exclusive. Indeed, at times there is much overlap.
MOORE, supra § 23.02-1, at 23-124.
Equally important was the change in the effect of res judicata. The new rule 23(b)
(3) binds all members of the described class who do not request to be excluded (opt-
out) from class membership. See generally WirHT, supra at 310-11. Rule 23(b) (3)
in that respect contrasts sharply with its 1938 counterpart, the spurious class action,
where the judgment bound only those who requested to intervene. Thus, the old spuri-
ous action was more akin to the current permissive joinder procedure (FED. R. Civ.
P. 20) than to a class action suit. A class action connotes the idea of plaintiff repre-
sentatives instituting an action on behalf of absent members of an alleged class. This
ingredient is missing in the spurious class and is a distinction which will be central
to the discussion.
Note, however, that there is disagreement on whether the three 1966 rule categories
are the counterparts to the 1938 true, hybrid, spurious trichotomy. 7 C. WRI0HT &
A. MiLLER, FEDERAL PRAcTcE AND PROCEDURE § 1752, at 514-15 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL PRACrIcE AND PROCEDURE] (analogizing the categories can be danger-
ously wrong). Professor Moore states: "The (b) (3) action is the old spurious class
action become mod. Its predecessor was an invitation to joinder, while the (b)(3)
action extends a privilege to a member to opt out." MoORE, supra § 23.02-1, at 23-124.
3. Kaplan, The Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rnv. 497
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]. Professor Kaplan was the reporter to the Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules from its organization in 1960 to July 1, 1966 and
since then has been a member of the committee. See also Ford, Federal Rule 23: A
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In December, 1973, the United States Supreme Court rendered a deci-
sion in Zahn v. International Paper Co.4 which both impeded judicial
economy and destroyed the diversity class action as a means by which
small claimants5 could litigate their claims. In so holding, the Court
Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 501 (1969).
Equity rules and the 1938 class action rule required affirmative action to intervene in
a spurious class action. Partly motivated by the desire to eliminate the costs to small
claimants, the new rule 23(b)(3) allows class members to participate in class actions
without requiring costly legal representation. Id. at 505-07.
4. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
5. Small claimant is an epithet widely used to describe this litigant. Two interpreta-
tions of this characterization are tenable. First, it is employed to describe the jurisdic-
tionally adequate ($10,000) David who must battle the corporate Goliath. In this
sense, the class action device is a means whereby such plaintiffs may join strength and
share costs in order to meet the financial burden. In Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125
F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941), the court stated:
To permit the defendants to contest liability with each claimant in a single, sepa-
rate suit, would, in many cases give defendants an advantage which would be al-
most equivalent to closing the door of justice to all small claimants. This is what
we think the class suit practice was to prevent.
In the alternative, small claimant connotes a class member with a typically small
claim (less than $10,000). The following offers support to this interpretation. The
1938 spurious class action (see note 2 supra) resembled a permissive joinder wherein
the named plaintiff had to meet the jurisdictional requirements. Once before the court,
however, intervenors were free to join the action regardless of jurisdictional minimum
or diversity. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588 (10th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); FEDERAL PRACncF_ AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 2, § 1755, at 552; Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporaneous Function
of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cr. L. REV. 684, 704 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Kalven].
The 23 (a) (3) action was functionally divided into the original parties and the interven-
ors. The 1966 rule 23(b)(3) sought to eliminate the need for the intervenors to re-
tain counsel in order to seek intervention. Rather, through its "Book of the Month"
type of notice procedure, the class member is included in the action by inaction on
his part. Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C.
IND). & CoM. L. REv. 501 (1969). Functionally, the unnamed class member is the in-
tervenor who now is not required to act affirmatively. If under the old rule the inter-
venor was not required to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements, then the new rule has
added nothing which would require it now.
Professor Kaplan (quoted in text accompanying note 3 supra) uses the phrase "small
fellow" in a context which points to the "party with a small claim" category. Following
the quote in the text, the professor stated "[t]he net effect of the decision [Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969)] is to disfavor the small fellow and thereby to defeat a
main purpose of the Rule revision" (of which he was the reporter). Kaplan, supra note
3, at 498. The Snyder decision disallowed a class action in which no one class member
had a $10,000 claim. It did not address itself to a case where the named plaintiff had
a $10,000 claim. Thus, the small claimant which Snyder disfavored was a "less than
$10,000" type, since a class with a $10,000 named plaintiff could have proceeded.
Lesch v. Chicago & E.I.R.R., 279 F. Supp. 908, 912 (D. Ill. 1968).
Some convincing policy arguments have been made which point to the significant
role played by class actions vis-a-vis the small (size of claim) claimant. Judge Wein-
stein views the availability of a national forum for small claimants as an "escape valve,
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relied on dubious precedent, ignored viable alternatives, and subverted
the intended purpose of the class action vehicle.
Zahn accomplished all of this by narrowly interpreting the re-
quirement that diversity jurisdiction be limited to cases where the "mat-
ter in controversy" exceeds -the sum of ten-thousand dollars.6 While
ambiguities have arisen from congressional failure to define the cryptic
phrase "matter in controversy, ''r the purpose of the amount in contro-
versy requirement is clear. It is designed to reduce the federal 'case-
load so that the federal judiciary might confine its attention to impor-
tant matters." In pursuit of the objective of caseload management,
the courts have developed the "aggregation" doctrine, a concept whose
roots are traceable to the decision of Pinel v. Pinel9
The settled rule is that when two or more plaintiffs having separate and
distinct demands unite in a single suit, it is essential that the demand
preventing explosive reactions during a period of boiling social change." Weinstein,
Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 300 (1973).
See Kalven, supra at 721 (effective quasi-public instrument in the contemporary adminis-
tration of justice); Note, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & CoM.
L. RLV. 539, 546-47 (1969) (fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, as a
goal of the amended rule, should encompass small claimants).
In Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), the court stated:
To assert that the minute interests of the parties before the court is a factor which
militates against allowing a class action is to ignore the spirit of Rule 23. Since,
as we have seen, if the plaintiff's claim is very large a class action is rendered
unnecessary, the main purpose of the class action is to provide a means of vindi-
cating small claims. It would be anomalous to hold that only major financial in-
terests can make use of it.
The position advocated by the Zahn petitioners is that, once the named plaintiffs have
met the jurisdictional requisite, thus compelling the court to hear their case, no purpose
is served by leaving the small claimant out. Rather, it would contravene the previously
mentioned policies. It was this claim which the Zahn Court erroneously rejected.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) reads in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
7. The phrase originally appeared in section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
limited jurisdiction to controversies in which the amount involved exceeded $500. In
1887 the amount was increased to $2,000. 1911 saw the amount increased to $3,000.
In 1958 the amount was increased to $10,000, as presently required under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-32 (1970). 414 U.S. at 293 n.l.
8. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969). See also 414 U.S. at 293 n.1 which
stated:
The legislative history discloses -that the change was made [1958 increase in the
jurisdictional amount to $10,000] "on the premise that the amount should be fixed
at a sum of money that will make jurisdiction available in all substantial contro-
versies . . . . The jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the
federal courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time
with petty controversies."
9. 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
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of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when several
plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a
common and undivided interest, it is enough if their interests collectively
equal the jurisdictional amount. 10
The Zahn majority utilized this "separate and distinct" aggregation
test to serve the coup de grace to recent trends in federal diversity class
actions.
In Zahn, the Supreme Court was confronted with a novel situation.
It was called upon to interpret the "matter in controversy" jurisdic-
tional requirement in a class action which, unlike previous cases, was
composed of named plaintiffs, all of whom met the jurisdictional
minimum, and unnamed class members, many of whom did not meet
the jurisdictional minimum."' It was not being asked to radically
overturn the aggregation principles of Pinel, but, on the contrary, to
apply Pinel to the named plaintiffs and to relax the interpretation of
the jurisdictional statute vis-a-vis the unnamed members. The major-
ity decided to apply the traditional construction of the aggregation doc-
trine to named and unnamed class members alike.'
2
The Court's decision was influenced by rule 8213 and congressional
re-enactment 14 arguments which it found to be insurmountable obsta-
cles to the relaxation of the "matter in controversy"' 5 requirement. A
closer investigation, however, reveals that these obstacles were sur-
mountable, that much of the majority opinion is based on precedent
which is of dubious value, that the ancillary jurisdiction analysis
10. Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
11. In Zahn, four lakefront property owners instituted a class action suit under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and two hundred other simi-
larly situated property owners. 414 U.S. at 291-92. The plaintiffs alleged property
damage stemming from the defendant's New York paper-making plant's discharge into
a river which emptied into Lake Champlain, Vermont, around which the plaintiffs' prop-
erty was situated. Federal jurisdiction rested on the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 . . . and is between-
(1) citizens of different states ....
The United States District Court for the District of Vermont ordered the action not to
proceed as a class action because the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement was not satisfied
by some members of the class, i.e., many of the unnamed plaintiffs. Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 432-34 (D. Vt. 1971). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the decision. Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972). Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court
sustained the lower court decisions. 414 U.S. at 292-93.
12. 414 U.S. at 301.
13. See text accompanying notes 16-17 infra.
14. See text accompanying note 18 infra.
15. 414 U.S. at 300-01.
19741
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made by the dissenters has more merit than the majority recognized,
that Zahn will not contribute to the management of the federal case-
load, and that the aftershocks of Zahn may be devastating to class ac-
tions.
RULE 82 AND RE-ENACTMENT
Rule 82 provides in part that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States District Courts." Since the "matter in controversy" requirement
is jurisdictional, any interpretation of rule 23 (the federal rule govern-
ing class actions) that purports to relax the definition of "matter in
controversy" would clearly exceed the limits of rule 82.16 This was
the conclusion drawn in Snyder v. Harris,"7 a decision which significantly
influenced Justice White's majority opinion in Zahn. In conjunc-
tion with this conclusion, the Snyder Court reasoned that the "separate
and distinct" aggregation doctrine launched by Pinel had been legisla-
tively adopted in the form of congressional re-enactments of the
"matter in controversy" requirement, all in apparent recognition of the
judicial gloss placed upon it. Since judicial gloss had been silently trans-
formed into statutory authority, the aggregation doctrine could only
be amended by congressional action.' 8
Despite the complete absence of any statutory language adopting the
Pinel doctrine and despite the absolute failure of anyone in the entire
course of the legislative history to even mention that approach, the Sny-
der court divined that, "The settled judicial interpretation of 'amount in
controversy' was implicitly taken into account by the relevant congres-
sional committee . *.". ." This startling conclusion was fortified
by the speculative observation that, "It is quite possible, if not probable,
that Congress chose the increase to $10,000 rather than the proposed
increases to $7,500 or $15,000 on the basis of workload estimates
which clearly relied on the settled doctrine that separate and distinct
claims could not be aggregated. '20
16. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337 (1969).
17. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). The 23(b) (3) class action was brought by one named
plaintiff on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. The named plaintiff's
claim fell short of the jurisdictional $10,000 minimum. The Court refused to aggregate
the claims of the class to reach the jurisdictional requisite.
18. 414 U.S. at 300.
19. 394 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added).
20. Id. In essence, Justice Black's reasoning was that Congress had the Phiel
doctrine's application to rule 23 actions in mind when it arrived at the $10,000 figure.
But for Pinel's applicability to class actions, Congress would have established a
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Surely there is force in the dissenting remarks of Justice Fortas:
"'It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congres-
sional silence to debar this Court from reexamining its own doctrines.'
It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adop-
tion of a controlling rule of law .... The silence of Congress and its
inaction are as consistent with a desire to leave the problem fluid as
they are with an adoption by silence of the rule of those cases."21
Even if the re-enactment reasoning were unassailable, it is by no
means clear that the Pinel doctrine should have controlled the result
in Zahn. The thrust of the majority was that the Court should not
modify past judicial constructions which have crystallized into legisla-
tive adoptions.22 But there is precedent which stands for the oppo-
site proposition. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires both a "mat-
ter in controversy" exceeding ten-thousand dollars and citizens of dif-
ferent states. The diversity of citizenship requirement is as much
higher jurisdictional amount-say $15,000. Justice Black would then conclude that
removal of Pinel from the 23(b) (3) class actions would increase the federal workload
beyond the level envisioned by Congress.
A decision of such dimensions requires much greater documentation than the casual
speculation about congressional motives that Snyder offered. The Pinel factor was not
demonstrably considered by Congress. Actually, the increase of the jurisdictional
amount from $3,000 to $10,000 reflected an intent to reduce that portion of the federal
judicial workload which resulted from economic inflation. See U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3101 (1958).
The present requirement of $3,000 has been on the statute books since 1911 and
obviously the value of the dollar in terms of its purchasing power has undergone
marked depreciation since that date. The Consumers Price Index for moderate in-
come families in large cities indicates a rise of about 152 percent since 1913,
shortly after the present $3,000 minimum was established. It is apparent that
since $3,000 was the smallest amount that was considered substantial in 1911 for
problems of Federal jurisdiction, there is today no substantiality in such an amount
for jurisdictional problems. Accordingly the committee believes that the standard
for fixing jurisdictional amounts should be increased to $10,000.
Id.
Even if Justice Black's perception of congressional intent were accurate, the Zahn
situation can be shown to fall outside the Black rationale. The congressional analysis
of the federal workload was limited to the study of the increase in number of cases.
Id. at 3105-35. In the Snyder situation, if aggregation were allowed the case would
have met jurisdictional requirements. If aggregation were not permitted, the case would
not have received federal judicial attention. Pinel's applicability in such a case would
be directly responsible for a decline in the federal workload. However, in the Zahn
situation, whether Pinel applied or not, the named plaintiffs who qualify for federal
jurisdiction are properly before the court, whether as part of a class action or individual
actions. The net result is that the workload-the number of cases-is not affected by
the Pinel doctrine. Paradoxically, Zahn may likely result in an unnecessary increase
of the federal workload. See notes 71-77 infra and accompanying text.
21. 394 U.S. at 348, quoting Giravard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946),
and citing Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428, 432 (1941). Cf. Massachusetts Trus-
tees v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 241 (1964) (requiring a showing that Congress
"advertently addressed itself" to the issue).
22. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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statutory in nature as the "matter in controversy" requirement. Yet,
the Supreme Court, in Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,2 inter-
preted the jurisdictional requirements with flexibility to allow federal
diversity jurisdiction in a class action despite intervention by non-di-
verse plaintiffs.24 Zahn, read together with Supreme Tribe of Ben
Hur, reveals a curious anomaly: unnamed plaintiffs must meet the re-
quired jurisdictional amount because of the statutory language (albeit
with a generous reading of the legislative history), but unnamed plain-
tiffs need not meet the jurisdictional diversity requirements despite the
statutory language. Thus, even if the re-enactment analysis of the
court were acceptable, the Zahn decision is difficult to square with Su-
preme Tribe of Ben Hur, nor can it be persuasively argued that the
Zahn result is required by other decisions of the Court.
DUBIOUS PRECEDENT RELIED UPON
Beginning with Snyder, much of the precedent relied upon by the
Zahn majority is of questionable value. In Snyder, the named plain-
tiff had stated claims which fell short of the "matter in controversy"
requirement.25  She asked the court to aggregate the claims of all
the members in the diversity rule 23(b)(3) class suit.20  The majority,
relying on traditional aggregation doctrines, 27 the re-enactment doc-
trine,2 and rule 82,29 denied the class action suit.30
23. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
24. Id. at 363-66.
25. 394 U.S. at 333-34.
26. Id. at 333.
27. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
28. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
29. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
30. 394 U.S. at 336-41. Another obstacle to the relaxation of the "matter in contro-
versy" requirement in rule 23 class actions which was recognized in Snyder was that
such an extension would necessarily extend to rule 20 permissive joinders and rule
18 joinder of claims. Id. at 340. Those provisions provide in part:
Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they as-
sert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or aris-
ing out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise
in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
Joinder of Claims. A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or
as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against
an opposing party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
In light of the post-1966 res judicata changes, which involve all 23(b) (3) members
who do not "opt-out" from being bound by the judgment, an extension to Rules 18 and
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The difficulty with the employment of Snyder as precedent in Zahn is
that the named plaintiff in Snyder did not meet the requisite jurisdic-
tional amount. By contrast, in Zahn each of the named plaintiffs
was in compliance. The Snyder plaintiff was seeking to change the
aggregation doctrine of Pinel in order to achieve the jurisdictional min-
imum. In Zahn, the court already had jurisdiction over the claims
of the four named plaintiffs. The Zahn petitioners sought not the
total avoidance of the aggregation rule, but only a reexamination
of the doctrine as it applied to unnamed class members and, alterna-
tively, application of ancillary jurisdiction principles to the case. Dis-
tinguishable on these facts, the statements of law from Snyder seem
inapplicable to Zahn, where the named plaintiffs did not need to ag-
gregate to reach the jurisdictional minimum.3
1
An indication of the inapplicability of Snyder to unnamed plaintiffs
is the majority's inability to isolate any language in Snyder applying
the holding to unnamed plaintiffs."2 The major thrust of Zahn is
that Snyder is applicable to unnamed as well as to named plaintiffs;
yet, incredibly, the only language making this attenuated connection is
relegated to a footnote:
The dissent recognizes that Clark requires the dismissal of any named
plaintiff in an action whose case does not satisfy the jurisdictional
amount. But apparently unnamed members of the class would enjoy
advantages not shared by the named plaintiffs since their separate and
distinct cases would be exempted from the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement. Why this should be the case and how this squares with
Clark or with Snyder v. Harris are left unexplained. We simply apply
20 may seem logical if other procedural devices in which all the parties before the court
were also bound by the judgment are to be accorded equal treatment.
Such an extension becomes less compelling, however, if the joinder concept is con-
trasted with the rationale of class actions, i.e., making a forum available for small
claimants, and the inherent guarantees of efficiency built into the class action criteria
which are not built into the joinder concept.
31. Prior to Snyder, the interpretation of the jurisdictional requirement in rule
23 actions was that only the named plaintiffs were compelled to attain the juris-
dictional amount without aggregation, unless the right asserted was common. See gen-
erally FEDERAL PRocnEDuE AND PRPAcnc, supra note 2, at 565. If Snyder had in-
tended to radically alter this procedure, it would undoubtedly have been explicit in its
language. Yet, many commentators disagreed on the impact of Snyder, which is a fur-
ther indication of the lack of intent to drastically modify the status quo ante. See, e.g.,
Kaplan, supra note 3, at 498 (holding applied to representatives of the class only).
32. In Snyder, the application of the aggregation principles to unnamed class mem-
bers was not even an issue. The case involved one named plaintiff with a claim be-
low the jurisdictional minimum. 394 U.S. at 333. In accord with established precedent,
that factor was dispositive of the case without necessitating analysis of the unnamed
members' claims.
19741
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the rule governing named plaintiffs joining in an action to the unnamed
members of a class, as Snyder v. Harris surely contemplated,
8
This inability to point to specific language from Snyder forces the
majority to superimpose the Snyder conclusions over the different
Zahn facts. The Court cites in abundance other authorities which
highlight the phrase "each plaintiff must" (or equivalent language).
8 4
The extraction of this phrase from several cases cited in Zahn illustrates
why their value as precedent is problematical. In cases which predate
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the "plaintiff" reference
is made to a named party, since no class actions yet existed.80 Some-
times the language arises in the context of a class action, but in a pre-
1966 context where again there were no unnamed parties.80 Finally,
language was extracted from Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,87 a case which
arguably is not even a class action; however, the Court cites it as central
to its holding, making it the link between joinder principles and class
actions.
38
The reliance of the Zahn and Snyder majorities on Clark is crucial
because it is alleged that this was the case which first applied the "sepa-
rate and distinct" aggregation doctrine to class actions. 9 In Clark, sev-
eral individuals, co-partnerships, and corporations joined to challenge
a California statute.4 0  The Court found that only one plaintiff satisfied
the "matter in controversy" minimum and, therefore, dismissed the oth-
ers from the action.4 '
Clark would be ideally suited to the needs of the Zahn and Snyder
analysis as a bridge between the older joinder cases and the newer
class action device.42  Without this link, there are but two shores. On
one lies an abundant source of precedent on "separate and distinct"
aggregation. On the other shore, there are class action procedures
with named and unnamed plaintiffs. If Clark is not a class action
case, it becomes but another pebble on the joinder shore. Chief Judge
33. 414 U.S. at 300-01 n.9 (emphasis added).
34. See notes 35-37 infra.
35. See 414 U.S. at 293-94, citing Troy v. Whitehead, 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
36 See 414 U.S. at 296, citing Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d
Cir. 1947).
37. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
38. See 414 U.S. at 295-96. See also text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
39. 394 U.S. at 336-37; 414 U.S. at 295.
40. 306 U.S. at 586-87.
41. Id. at 589-90.
42. "Both Troy Bank and Pinel were joinder cases, but Snyder stated that Clark ap-
plied this joinder doctrine to class actions .... " 53 F.R.D. at 431 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
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Leddy, who wrote the majority opinion in Zahn at the district court
level, remarked: "[w]e confess that we can find nothing in the official
report of Clark clearly indicating that it was, in fact, a class action.'13
Several details corroborate the position that Clark was not a class
action suit. First, if a class action is dismissed, leaving only individual
claims, the omission of language "dismissing the class action" is peculiar.
In the Zahn district court opinion there is such language; 44 in the
Clark opinion there is not. Another detail which supports the po-
sition that Clark was not a class suit is the date of the decision. The
case was decided by the United States Supreme Court in April, 1939.
The original action was probably filed in 1938 or earlier. This sub-
stantially reduces the probability that the action was filed pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted only in July of 1938.
Furthermore, rule 23, then a new creation of the Supreme Court,
would naturally have invited comment. Again, not one isolated refer-
ence to rule 23 or to class actions is to be found in the decision-a
significant omission, surely significant enough -to give one pause be-
fore citing Clark as an insurmountable obstacle to the petitioners' de-
mands in Zahn.
The Zahn majority also cites Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co.45 and
Hacker v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York4" for the proposition that
a spurious class action is, in effect, "'but a congeries of separate suits
so that each claimant must, as to his own claim, meet jurisdictional
requirements.' ,,17 This again is misleading. Taken in a light most favor-
able to the Zahn majority, it means that each plaintiff must satisfy juris-
dictional requirements. Under the pre-1966 rule 23(b)(3) action,
the only category of plaintiffs which existed was that of named plain-
tiffs. 48 As a condition precedent to membership in the class, the po-
tential member had to petition the court to intervene. Each poten-
tial class member's credentials were reviewed by the court prior to ad-
mission into the class. Under the amended rule 23 (1966), the named
plaintiff representatives bind the entire class without prior interven-
tion. In fact, the new rule binds all members of the described class
43. Id.
44. "Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that reference to all persons other than the
four named plaintiffs be stricken from the complaint and that this action not be per-
mitted to proceed as a class action." Id. at 434.
45. 164 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1947).
46. 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941).
47. 414U.S. at 296, quoting Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d
Cir. 1947).
48. See note 2 supra.
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who do not specifically request to be excluded from class membership.
Thus, the conclusion that pre-1966 courts were applying the Pinel doc-
trine to post-1966 forms of plaintiffs is untenable. The amendment
to rule 23 created a new procedural context and a type of plaintiff
neither countenanced nor controlled by pre-1966 precedents.
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
The dissenting opinions of Justice Brennan and Judge Timbers
adamantly point out that the respective courts neglected a viable alter-
nate theory for finding jurisdiction-ancillary jurisdiction.49  It is dis-
turbing that neither -the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court ad-
dressed a response to the extensive discussion of this concept by both
dissenting opinions. The ancillary jurisdiction analysis of the dissenters
is unassailable and need only be capsulized and complemented with
some cases which clarify the position and further buttress it.
Judge Timbers relied heavily on United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.0
In Gibbs, the plaintiff stated claims, arising out of the same facts, al-
leging violation of both federal and state law. 1 Jurisdiction over the
state claim was based on pendent jurisdiction, a close relative to ancil-
lary jurisdiction.52 The Supreme Court concluded:
Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest pos-
sible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties . . . . Pend-
ent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there
is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, -and Treaties made" . . . and the relationship between that
claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action
before the court comprises but one constitutional "case". . . . The state
and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
facts. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state char-
acter, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected
to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality
of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the
whole.53
The Gibbs rationale may bei attacked on the basis that it is ad-
dressed to a distinguishable issue: whether a federal court may extend
its jurisdiction to claims presented by the plaintiff cognizable under
49. 414 U.S. at 305-09 and 469 F.2d at 1036-40 respectively.
50. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
51. Id. at 717-18.
52. Id. at 725-29. See WRiGHT, supra note 2, at 19-21, for the subtle distinction be-
tween the ancillary jurisdiction concept and its variant application, pendent jurisdictio=
53. 383 U.S. at 724-25.
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state but not federal law. Zahn treats the problem of "additional par-
ties" as opposed to additional claims by a party properly before the
court. This objection may be overcome.
In a case dating back to 1866, the Supreme Court stated that the
presence of "parties" over whom jurisdiction could not have been ob-
tained independently does not forbid the court from proceeding.
54
"For such proceeding should be treated as incidental to the jurisdiction
thus acquired, and auxiliary to it. . .. "I'
More recently the Fourth Circuit confronted the same issue in Stone
v. Stone.5 In that case, the plaintiff stated claims against three de-
fendants which individually fell short of the jurisdictional $10,000 min-
imum. The majority reversed the trial court and held that two claims
against the one defendant could be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional
minimum. 7  Next, an analogy to the Gibbs cise was recognized
which resulted in the court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the
remaining defendants.58 After discussing the Gibbs concept of "nu-
cleus of operative facts," the court concluded:
We find significance in. the Court's emphasis on whether the "entire
action" may be viewed as "but one constitutional 'case'," and are per-
suaded... that the same question should be asked in multi-claim di-
versity cases. If the entire lawsuit before us may be viewed as a single
constitutional "case," the District Court could have taken jurisdiction
Justice Brennan [in Gibbs] explicitly stated the factors that are criti-
cal in determining whether a single "case" is involved. The court
thought that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fair-
ness should govern. .... 59
Even more recently, the Supreme Court had occasion to comment on
the Gibbs ancillary-pendent jurisdiction doctrine. In Moor v. County
of Alameda,10 the plaintiffs sought to invoke ancillary jurisdiction over
a defendant who had not met the jurisdictional requirement."' The dis-
54. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886).
55. Id. at 241.
56. 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968).
57. Id. at 96.
58. Id. at 97-98.
59. Id. at 98.
60. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
61. The defendant, Alameda County, avoided plaintiffs' jurisdictional claims by con-
tending that it was not a suable person for the purpose of the Civil Rights Act, under
which it was being sued. Id. at 707. This failure to establish jurisdiction independ-
ently over the county made it necessary for the plaintiff to put forth an ancillary juris-
diction theory based on the jurisdiction that had been properly established over another
defendant. Id. at 711.
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trict court declined to exercise jurisdiction.62 The Supreme Court, rec-
ognizing the dual nature of ancillary jurisdiction, power and discretion,
upheld the district court's decision as a proper exercise of its discre-
tion.63 But in dictum, the court stated:
As to the question of judicial power, the District Court and Court
of Appeals considered themselves bound by the Ninth Circuit's previous
decision in Hymer v. Chai wherein the court refused to permit the
joinder of a pendent plaintiff. ... It is true that numerous decisions
throughout the courts of appeals since Gibbs have recognized the exist-
ence of judicial power to hear pendent claims involving pendent parties
where the "entire action before the court comprises but one constitu-
tional 'case"' as defined in Gibbs. Hymer stands virtually alone
against this post-Gibbs trend in the courts of appeals, and .. .was
largely based on ...a decision which predated Gibbs . . . .More-
over, the exercise of federal jurisdiction over claims against parties as
to whom there exists no independent basis for federal jurisdiction finds
substantial analogues in the joinder of new parties under the well-estab-
lished doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of compulsory
counter claims .. . and in the context of third-party claims .... 04
If the Zahn court had allowed jurisdiction over the claims of the
unnamed class members, the purpose of the ancillary jurisdiction doc-
trine65 would have been well-served. The proceeding would have
promoted judicial economy and fairness by litigating all of the related
claims in one court; instead, piecemeal litigation was fostered. As for
the fear that the federal courts will be overtaxed, that possibility is re-
mote since the court is vested with several checking mechanisms. Ancil-
lary jurisdiction is discretionary; 66 therefore, the court can decline to
exercise it when it fears abuse. Furthermore, the "nucleus of operative
facts" test established by Gibbs67 further limits the application of an-
62. Id. at 697.
63. Id. at 712-15.
64. Id. at 713-15 (citation omitted and emphasis in original). The court is quick
to indicate the unsettled state of the law in this area, however:
rThe County counsels that the Court should not be quick to sweep state law claims
against an entirely new party within the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
which are courts of limited jurisdiction-a jurisdiction subject, within the limits of
the Constitution, to the will of Congress, not the courts. Whether there exists
judicial power to bear the state law claims against the County is, in short, a subtle
and complex question with far-reaching implications. But we do not consider it
appropriate to resolve this difficult issue in the present case.
Id. at 715.
65. It promotes judicial economy and convenience. 383 U.S. at 727.
66. Id. at 726. Here the Court applied pendent jurisdiction and recognized its dis-
cretionary nature. Note that pendent jurisdiction is a cousin to ancillary jurisdiction.
See note 52 supra. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970) which expressly delineates
the ancillary jurisdictional feature of the removal statute as discretionary.
67. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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ciliary jurisdiction. Finally, when the doctrine is applied in class ac-
tions, rule 23 itself provides a multitude of internal checks against
abuse."8 One court summed it up well in Almenares v. Wyman69 when
it said:
This is sufficient to vest the court with subject-matter jurisdiction not
merely over their primary claim but also over their pendent claims...
whether against the defendant to the primary claim or another. We
see no valid distinction in the power of the court to join additional
plaintiffs. Neither do we perceive any inherent limitation that makes
Rule 23 per se inapplicable to a pendent claim so long as the claim
meets the Gibbs -test of a "common nucleus of operative facts" with the
primary claim as well as those of Rule 23 itself.70
AFTERMATH OF ZARN
A. Judicial Workload
The looming presence of Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur perhaps ex-
plains the unwillingness of the Court to relax construction of the mat-
ter in controversy requirement. In Snyder, Justice Black expressed
concern that one of the two floodgates of diversity jurisdiction had al-
ready been relaxed in Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur.71 If the limiting
effect of the aggregation doctrine were also lifted, then the federal case-
load would expand beyond reasonable bounds.71 These are the prac-
tical overtones in both Snyder and Zahn, but reduction of the federal
workload will not likely be accomplished by this decision.73 A probe
into the probable consequences of Zahn discloses that the burden in
some cases may have been increased, not reduced. Consider the
following hypothetical: Twelve named plaintiffs have claims over
$10,000 each, based on state law. They institute a rule 23(b) (3) class
suit in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The unnamed
68. See note 2 supra.
69. 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. Id. at 1084 (footnote omitted).
71. In expressing this concern Justice Black stated:
Under current doctrine, if one member of a class is of diverse citizenship from
the class' opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties, the suit may
be brought in federal court even though all other members of the class are citizens
of the same State as the defendant and have nothing to fear from trying the law-
suit in the courts of their own State. To allow aggregation of claims where only
one member of the entire class is of diverse citizenship could transfer into federal
courts numerous local controversies involving exclusively questions of state law.
394 U.S. at 340.
72. Id.
73. The Zahn majority relies on Snyder to a great extent; and Snyder, in part, rests
on the practical need to prevent the federal caseload from being overburdened. Id. at
339-41.
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members of the class consist of one-hundred plaintiffs with $1,000
claims each. Guided by the Zahn holding, the district court would
dismiss the class action suit for failure to satisfy jurisdictional require-
ments. Result: the federal judiciary would be required to hear as many
as one to twelve actions74 filed in different courts if the geographical
distribution of the diverse plaintiffs places them in different districts
and if they do not themselves seek to join in one action. Even if the
cases are ultimately forced to consolidate, the effort expended in
hearing motions for consolidations and for forum changes will have fur-
ther taxed the federal workload. Could it then be truly said that the
burden on the federal court, not to mention the burden on the judi-
cial system as a whole,7 5 has been significantly reduced?
74. In Zahn, the court still had to hear the claims of the four remaining plaintiffs
who chose to join in one action. 469 F.2d at 1039.
75. A tangential issue which may affect the judicial system as a whole is the effect
Zahn will have on -the statute of limitations. In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968), the court addressed itself to the
statute of limitations aspect of a 23(b)(3) class action suit. When the class action
is not allowed, should a member of the alleged class be precluded from instituting an
individual action if the statute of limitations period has lapsed? The answer, according
to that court, is that it depends on the reason for which the class is denied. If the
class action is denied because of failure to meet the criteria established in rule 23 or
some 23 (b) (3) technicality, then the statute of limitations is not tolled. Id. at 461.
If there never really was a class to be represented, members of the purported class
can scarcely be heard to claim that they started suit, vicariously, before the limita-
tions period expired. But if the reason for the negative determination stems from
a weighing of various considerations of judicial housekeeping . . . an opportunity
should be presented for proof of reliance upon the pendency of the purported class
action sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
Id. The issue becomes whether a finding that some members of the purported class
do not meet federal jurisdictional requirements will be treated as if there was not a
class from the inception. Such a finding is plausible since, after the Zahn decision,
a class will be understood as a collection of plaintiffs where each meets the jurisdic-
tional sum individually. If such is the finding, then the statute of limitations would
not be tolled and the subsequent individual actions would be barred. As a foreseeable
consequence, class members will in the future routinely file parallel individual state ac-
tions.
Philadelphia Electric has been cited favorably in the recent United States Supreme
Court case of American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 n.20
(1974). The American Pipe Court's narrow holding stated that, where a class is estab-
lished but is found to be not numerous enough, the statute of limitations will be tolled.
Philadelphia Electric turns on whether there is a class in the first instance. Conse-
quently, a finding by Zahn standards that no class exists would result in the continued
running of the limitation period. See Buford v. American Finance Co., 333 F. Supp.
1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971), which said of this problem:
It would be inconsistent with the purpose of Rule 23 to insist that in every lawsuit
in which a plaintiff seeks to maintain a class action, the proposed members of the
class file precautionary individual actions.
Id. at 1252. As stated, the fear of likely failures of rule 23 actions in the future will
result in class members increasingly resorting to this safety valve.
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Moreover, the mechanics required by the Zahn procedure will con-
tribute to the federal workload. Under pre-Zahn procedure, the court
was required to define the composition of the class by some objective
criteria. Post-Zahn courts will be called upon to define the class as
possessing some common denominator and, additionally, as having a
$10,000 per individual claim. This prerequisite for the existence of a
class will create additional litigation for the federal courts. But more
importantly, -how and when will this evaluation be made? The Zahn
district court opinion reflected upon this imponderable:
Indeed, we think this problem is insuperable in the case at bar, for
we can find no appropriate class over which we have jurisdiction. A
class defined as all lakefront landowners and lessees in the towns of
Orwell, Shoreham, and Bridport having $10,000 in controversy would
not be feasible. The class would have to be further defined either be-
fore or after trial on the liability issue. A determination before trial
of the landowners actually encompassed within this class would require
the unnamed class members to appear and at least plead, and perhaps
prove facts substantiating, an amount in controversy. This would elimi-
nate any advantage of a class action over joinder; a class action would
therefore not be properly maintainable because class treatment would
not be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy," as required by Rule 23(b) (3). Nor
could further definition of the class be postponed until after trial on
the liability issue. . . . [I]f liability were found not to exist in the
case at bar, the res judicata effect of the judgment would depend 'On
an evaluation at some future date of whether a given class member had
$10,000 in controversy at the time of this action. This is clearly an
impossible task. And if liability were found to exist, the question of
jurisdiction would be hopelessly intertwined with the determination of
damages, despite the fact that the "inability of plaintiff to recover an
amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad
faith or oust the jurisdiction."
76
A related problem is the invitation to abuse created by this new
procedure. Zahn permits members to maintain a low profile until the
outcome of the case. If the verdict is favorable, then these plaintiffs
appear before the court, allege a $10,000 injury, and claim member-
ship in the class for the purpose of sharing in the judgment. If, how-
ever, the decision is adverse, these same plaintiffs will appear in state
court with a $9,000 claim, in which case res judicata will not operate to
their detriment. Such optional membership is difficult to reconcile with
76. 53 F.R.D. at 433-34, quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303
U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
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the class action concept. 77
B. Federal Question Statute
Aside from the increased burdens placed on the federal judiciary,
Zahn has left its imprints on other areas of the law. One such area
is the companion to the diversity jurisdiction statute, the federal ques-
tion statute.
Since Zahn was a diversity case, most attention was drawn to 28
U.S.C. § 1332;11 however, the holding claimed to govern the mean-
ing of the "matter in controversy" requirement, which also appears in
the federal question jurisdiction statute--28 U.S.C. § 1331.70 In sub-
stance, the choice of the "matter in controversy" requirement as the ve-
hicle to redress the alleged abuse of federal diversity jurisdiction s0 will
also restrict the availability of federal courts in class action cases arising
under the Constitution or federal laws.
C. Removal Statute
In addition to the impact on the federal question jurisdictional stat-
77. Under the 1938 rule 23, it was possible in some cases to await the outcome of
the case and then, if favorable, the party would intervene and benefit from that judg-
ment. If the disposition was unfavorable, intervention would not be sought, but rather,
the bystander would file a separate action. In the latter case, res judicata would not
preclude the suit. This "one way" intervention was remedied in the new rule 23(b)
(3) class action mechanism by way of the rule 23(c)(3) negative notice feature-
the party is bound unless he requested to be excluded before the suit's outcome. Ad-
visory Committee's Note, supra note 2, at 105-06. See also WRIGHT, supra note 2,
at 314.
78. See note 11 supra.
79. 414 U.S. at 302 n.11. For the text of section 1331, see note 6 supra. Justice
Brennan, in his dissent in Zahn, questions the efficacy of this argument. He stated:
The Court also observes, quite correctly, that the same rule on aggregation has
been applied to the federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But the asser-
tion, in the Court's final footnote, that the same jurisdictional rules it announces
for § 1332 will apply to § 1331, is even more questionable than its application
of those rules in this case. The continued need for exercise of the diversity juris-
diction, at least where a showing of prejudice is not made, has been challenged
by respected authorities. But a sharply different view has been taken of the fed-
eral question jurisdiction, and the Court has reflected that view in its decisions
upholding the exercise of jurisdiction over pendent claims under state law. Simi-
larly significant disincentives to assertion of federal rights in federal forums are
likely if claimants are barred from combining to reduce the time and cost of liti-
gation.
414 U.S. at 304 n.5 (citations omitted).
80. The Snyder court stated concern for the ease of access to and use of federal
courts where state courts were equally available and could have been utilized. 394 U.S.
at 339-41. If curtailing this practice was the end sought in Zahn, then the means se-
lected, i.e., "matter in controversy," was too broad because it restricted federal question
class actions as well a those arising out of diversity.
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ute, the Zahn holding yields results which will be inconsistent with
the operation of the removal statute."1 It would be incongruous if
four named plaintiffs were unable to bring a class action, as in Zahn,
yet, if the action were removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the court
could exercise ancillary power over all those claims which do not meet
the jurisdictional requirements.
Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.82 is a good example.
In that case, the plaintiffs brought a class action against the defendant
based on nuisance.83 The defendant had the action removed to the
federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). 4 The district
court held that there were two class actions: the first, under rule
23(b) (1) and (2), for injunctive relief and the second, under rule
23 (b) (3), for past damages." The right to live in a clean environment
was valued at over $10,000 for purposes of injunctive relief.8 6  Then,
the claim for damages was also removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c),
even though the monetary damages were less than $10,000.87
The same result might also be reached by using the Stone v. Stone an-
alogy88 and applying ancillary-pendent jurisdiction principles to en-
compass additional "parties" within the court's jurisdiction. But this
would not even be necessary in the present case. In Zahn, the class
could seek both past damages and injunctive relief. The injunctive
relief would satisfy the jurisdictional requirement s9 and the ancillary
jurisdictional power in the statute would permit removal of the dam-
ages claim too.
The removal procedure can only be initiated by the defendant,90
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970), reads in part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have orig-
inal jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the dis-
trict court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending ....
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would
be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-remov-
able claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district
court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters
not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
82. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
83. Id. at 355-58.
84. Id. at 355.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See note 81 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
89. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 117-19.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970) (see note 81 supra).
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but removals will occur,9' and when they do, courts will be faced with
this new problem.
Possibly Congress will respond to Zahn with an amendment to -the
diversity jurisdiction statute92 which would permit rule 23 class ac-
tions to be maintained if the jurisdictional requirements are met by
the named plaintiffs. By requiring the named plaintiffs to satisfy
the jurisdictional minimum, the federal court limits its jurisdiction to
such cases which, but for the class action, would have reached its
docket anyway.
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the Court concluded as it did in view of the
many alternate theories and approaches available to it. If the Zahn
Court had allowed class action suits to proceed as long as the named
plaintiffs satisfied the jurisdictional minimum, the holding would have
been more in tune with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure93 and with
accepted concepts of ancillary jurisdiction. 4 The decision would have
remained faithful to the purpose of the "matter in controversy""5 re-
quirement and to rule 23,96 while assuring greater judicial economy'
with safeguards against abuse provided by the criteria of rule 2306
and the discretion vested in the court Jby ancillary jurisdiction."0
Lubomyr Carpiac
91. Denial of class action treatment in some cases may result in the filing of sep-
arate individual and class actions in the various states where the class members reside.
If the statute of limitations is long and the geographical dispersal of class members is
great, the defendant, faced with the prospect of piecemeal litigation may seek removal
to federal court in order to obtain a single disposition of this case and avoid the costly
multiplicity of suits. The discretionary ancillary power may prove attractive to such
defendants.
92. WIGrr, supra note 2, at 316. Professor Wright states:
It would be highly desirable if Congress were to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to
provide that in any case permitted to be maintained as action under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the aggregate claims for or against all members of the
class shall be regarded as the matter in controversy.
Id.
93. See notes 2-5 supra.
94. See notes 49-70 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 8 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 5 supra and text accompanying note 3 supra.
97. See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 2 supra.
99. See notes 65-70 supra and accompanying text.
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